Given from the Catholic Broadcasting Station 2SM Sydney Australia
Choose a topic from Vol 3:
Not always. But very often it is so. Reason has both extensive and intensive limits. It is limited as to the number of things it can know, and in the power of penetration it can bring to bear upon them. The specialist is a man who has had to abandon many avenues of knowledge in order to concentrate on a few things. And on his death-bed he himself would gladly admit that he does not know all about even the few things in which he specialized. Still the average man would not dispute the findings of the specialist. He would be indignant if any other average man disputed the views of the specialist. But in the field of religion he himself would feel free to air his views to all and sundry, though never had he specialized in either philosophy or theology. Instinctively he mistrusts his own knowledge and reasoning capacity in other matters, but not in religion. It is a peculiar phenomenon of the human being.
In what way?
If he repents at last there is one possible crime that he has not committed. For he has not died unrepentant. However we can let that go. It is a fact that, no matter what his crimes, a Catholic who dies repentant, and with the Sacraments of the Church, will save his soul. He will, of course, expiate his multiplied sins in purgatory; and will thus find that, though he has attained salvation, the multiplication of his sins was not a thing that did not matter. You may say, "But all the same, he is saved." But remember the conditions. I have said, "If he repents, and receives the Sacraments." That little "if" forbids presumption, and checks any tendency to throw oneself into a life of continued sin. For what man can say that he will have time to repent; or that he will suddenly develop the good dispositions necessary to correspond with such graces as God does offer him; or that his plan to receive the Sacraments at the last will be realized? All these considerations tend to make a man think. However if all the conditions are realized, a man will save his soul through God's mercy, no matter how many or great his crimes.
Apart from other factors his fate would depend on his degree of responsibility before God for his unbelief. If he had had no opportunity for sufficient study to discern the truth of the Catholic religion, or was so dense that through no fault of his own he could not perceive its truth despite an effort at impartial consideration, then he would not be held responsible for his unbelief by God. He would be judged on other factors.
It is difficult to believe that an intelligent man could regard himself as honest because he acknowledges his debts to his fellow men whilst he refuses to acknowledge any debt to God. However you suppose that he has led what he really believes to be an honest life. If by that you mean that he has never violated his conscience during the whole of his life in any serious matter, there is no need to believe that he is condemned to eternal torment. And, even if he has violated his conscience in such a way, he would be saved did he repent sincerely before death with the help of such graces as God would offer him. Where he would undoubtedly lose his soul would be in the case where he would persist in rejecting the Christian religion despite a conviction that it was indeed from God.
We do not for a moment believe that a believing bad Catholic can be saved. All we maintain is that a believing Catholic who has been bad can be saved provided he becomes good by repentance of his wickedness, and by reception of the grace of Christ before he dies. And that is a very different proposition. Nor do we say that an unbelieving good rationalist is lost. For if he is indeed good, then his unbelief is not his own fault; and we hold that God will not blame him for what is not really his own fault. Your conclusion that belief is more important than conduct is really meaningless. Belief is conduct. Belief and unbelief are merely ways of conducting oneself in the presence of a proposition offered for our consideration. If God declares a thing to be true, then it is most improper conduct to refuse to believe it. On the other hand, belief is correct conduct in such a case. This foolish division between belief and conduct seems to be based on the idea that kind conduct towards our fellow men in other matters justifies the outrageous conduct towards God of not caring in the least whether He has revealed any doctrines, or whether they are true or not.
Thomas Paine cannot strictly be called an infidel. He professed always a firm belief in God, and in the immortality of the human soul. On the very first page of his book attacking all revealed religion he declares that he believes in God, and hopes for eternal happiness. An infidel does not talk like that. His very writings, however, show that he never had any real understanding of the Christian religion, and that he never attained to the gift of faith in that religion as revealed by God. And he died without doing so, insofar as men can judge. He certainly expressed no recantation of his writings against Christianity, and probably died still under the delusion that he had good grounds both in fact and in reason for rejecting that form of religion. Men who mistake fallacies for sound reasoning are little likely to detect their own fallacies. But the chief trouble with Thomas Paine was his colossal ignorance of subjects upon which he took it for granted that he was well-informed. How responsible he was for this attitude before God must be left to God; as also the question of his ultimate fate.
There is no need to bring in the screams. Shortly before his death he asked for a priest, and sought reconciliation with the Catholic Church. The interpretation of his action is very difficult. Much exaggerated nonsense has been given out about Voltaire's dying dispositions by both supporters and opponents of the Christian religion. In one thing certainly Voltaire was sincere. He did not want to be refused Christian burial. But whether he was sincere in complying with the conditions required by the Church is hotly disputed. He never made a full and clear retraction of his blasphemous attacks on Christianity. And it is hard to believe that he really meant such professions of faith as he did make. A man who has indulged for years the habit of malicious mockery of religion does not change his mentality in a moment, unless by a miracle such as Voltaire certainly did not deserve. And it is quite possible that the fruit of a lifetime of deceptions was a last grim and tragic self-deception. But none of these cases proves opposition between reason and revelation, or that there is any conflict between science and the Catholic Faith.