Given from the Catholic Broadcasting Station 2SM Sydney Australia
Choose a topic from Vol 2:
The State possesses the right on the same principle as an individual who may kill an unjust aggressor, if there be no other efficacious way in which to preserve his own life. Those whose crimes gravely threaten the well-being of society may be put to death by social authority when lesser penalties prove inefficacious as a control upon them. God Himself sanctioned this law in Hebrew society, and it is entirely reasonable. If the extreme penalty could not be lawfully inflicted by the State upon enemies of the common good, much greater and more widespread evils would ensue.
He knows he is hanging an individual person, and the name of the person. But he is not guilty of murder. Firstly, he acts not as a private person, but as the agent of the State exercising lawful authority. Secondly, his intention is not one of personal revenge but of doing a lawful act for the common good. His fulfillment of duty, far from being evil, could be quite meritorious. Motive makes morality.
The very Bible which gives you the commandment also records God's authorization of death as a penalty when inflicted by lawful authority.
Even were that so, the question of capital punishment is not affected. The State right to inflict the penalty of death is an inherent right of society as such, independently of those who are in actual authority. The government gets its mandate of ordinary temporal administration from the people. But the social right to self-protection does not come from the people. It is from God, and, therefore, is an inherent and natural right. The people can vote governments in and out of office, but this merely means that they decide who shall be the agents of social authority. The inherent rights of social authority remain unaffected.
You are viewing only one aspect of the case. The normal law of the land—and it is just a law—is that the penalty for a capital crime is death.That is, a man's life normally depends upon his avoiding those crimes which are classified as capital, and it depends, therefore, upon himself. If a government applies the law and inflicts the penalty—that is normal procedure. If a government commutes the sentence of death, that is abnormal—and we may say that those whose sentences are commuted are fortunate; though they may not be—and may endure far more bodily and mental anguish over a long period than one who suffers the extreme penalty.But whilst we may congratulate those whose sentences are commuted, we cannot regard one whose sentence is not commuted as having been deprived of any just right.The accidental change of government is external to the question. A man does not commit a crime relying on an accidental retention of a favorable government in power. I suppose had I gone to Napier, in New Zealand, just prior to the accidental earthquake and been killed, my friend who did not go, could worry that an accident alone made such a difference between our fates. But if I knew that an accident was more than possible, and I deliberately courted the danger, he would rather speak of my folly.
Not at all. Nor is anyone expected to be inhuman. But in this, as in many other cases, there are two sides to the question. It is quite possible to have great sympathy for an individual who encounters disaster, yet to experience a reasonable relief that other good ends have been attained; and that a sufficient sanction and deterrent has been upheld for the good of the community.